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Abstract
We study the impact of numerical expenditure rules on the propensity of governments 
to deviate from expenditure targets in response to surprises in cyclical conditions. 
Theoretical considerations suggest that due to political fragmentation in the 
budgetary process expenditure policy might be prone to a pro-cyclical bias. However, 
this tendency may be mitigated by numerical expenditure rules. These hypotheses are 
tested against data from a panel of EU Member States. Our key findings are that (i) 
deviations between actual and planned government expenditure are positively related 
to unanticipated changes in the output gap, and (ii) numerical expenditure rules 
reduce this pro-cyclical bias. Moreover, the pro-cyclical spending bias is found to be 
particularly pronounced for spending items with a high degree of budgetary 
flexibility.  
JEL classification: C23, E62, H50
Keywords: expenditure rules, fiscal discipline, stabilisation, spending bias  
Non-Technical Summary 
In the last two decades, governments have increasingly adopted numerical fiscal rules 
which aim to promote fiscal discipline by setting explicit targets or ceilings for key 
budgetary aggregates. In this context, a broad consensus on the beneficial role of rules 
to restrict government expenditure has emerged. In particular, many policy observers 
have argued that they may mitigate pro-cyclical expenditure overruns in upturns and 
reduce the need to make up for such spending profligacy in ensuing downturns.  
However, empirical evidence regarding the impact of expenditure rules on the cyclical 
stance of government spending has been relatively scarce. Against this background, 
we conduct an econometric analysis of expenditure policies in EU Member States 
over the period 2002-2008. More specifically, we study whether the response of 
government spending to surprising developments in the cyclical position of the 
economy differs in countries with strong and weak expenditure rules. Our key 
findings are (i)  that government spending has been subject to a pro-cyclical bias, 
defined as the tendency to over-spend (under-spend) when cyclical conditions are 
unexpectedly favourable (unfavourable), and (ii) that numerical expenditure rules 
reduce this pro-cyclical bias. Thus, from a policy perspective the results confirm both 
the need for rules-based restrictions to expenditure policy and their effectiveness.  
Turning to a disaggregated analysis of government spending, our results point to 
markedly different patterns across expenditure items: while the pro-cyclical bias is 
particularly pronounced for spending items with a high degree of budgetary flexi-
bility, no cyclical patterns may be detected for (largely non-discretionary) interest 
expenditure. For the institutional design of numerical expenditure rules this result 
implies a trade-off: on the one hand, extending the rules’ scope to non-discretionary 
spending items may be unnecessary and compliance would be more dependent on 
factors outside the control of policy-makers. On the other hand, transparency is likely 
to suffer from an exemption of certain aspects of government activity. This in turn 
would reinforce the policy-makers’ information advantage over their electorate and 
creditors and thus undermine the primary purpose of numerical fiscal rules. Moreover, 
in the long run essentially all government spending can be influenced by policy-
makers. Thus, diverting fiscal accountability away from certain spending items may 
introduce or reinforce a bias of fiscal policy towards the status quo. 
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1 Introduction 
Self-enforced institutional restrictions to budgetary decision-making are a common 
feature of fiscal governance in industrialised countries.
1 In particular, in the last two 
decades, governments have increasingly adopted numerical fiscal rules which set 
explicit ceilings for key budgetary aggregates.
2 These rules are mainly motivated as a 
device to correct coordination failures inherent in the budgetary process: governments 
typically consist of multiple decision-makers which cater to diverse constituencies 
and compete for overall fiscal resources available to society, thus giving rise to a 
common pool problem.
3 As a consequence, fiscal policy is biased towards 
inefficiently high levels of government spending which might be mitigated by 
restricting governments’ discretion through fiscal rules.  
In addition to excess spending, previous literature also suggests that these common 
pool problems may induce a pro-cyclical bias in fiscal policy: for example, Tornell 
and Lane (1999) develop a dynamic framework in which multiple political groups 
with diverse preferences compete for a common tax base via the budgetary process. 
Under favourable macroeconomic circumstances (i.e. when the tax base increases) the 
incentive for each interest group to raise its share of the common pool becomes 
stronger, whereas in downturns the opposite holds true.
4 Similarly, Talvi and Végh 
(2005) assume that budgetary surpluses in booms necessary for tax smoothing are 
costly from a government’s perspective as they create political pressure to increase 
public spending.
5 As a consequence, additional revenue in booms will not fully 
translate into a larger surplus but will partly result in extra spending relative to the 
optimal level required by tax smoothing. By contrast, in downturns spending will fall 
since, due to “excess spending” in booms, the surplus generated in previous periods 
will not suffice to meet the solvency constraint. These theoretical considerations 
                                                 
1 For an overview, see Hallerberg et al. (2007) and Debrun et al. (2008).  
2 See European Commission (2006). For a conceptual clarification and definition of numerical fiscal 
rules see Kopits and Symanski (1998). 
3 For the seminal contributions to this literature see Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981), von Hagen 
and Harden (1995) and Alesina and Perotti (1996). For an alternative explanation of pro-cyclical 
spending policies focussing on the role of borrowing restrictions see e.g. Büttner and Wildasin (2009). 
4 This reasoning abstracts from endogenous anti-cyclical expenditure reactions to macroeconomic 
shocks due to automatic stabilisers. 
5 While the anecdotal evidence in the paper mainly relates to less developed countries, similar 
tendencies may be observed in European countries. For a discussion of the German case see, e.g., the 
Annual Report of the German Council of Economic Experts, 2007/2008 p. 12. For the classical 
argument on tax smoothing see Barro (1979). 
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provide an explanation for empirical findings suggesting a positive relation between 
public spending and the cyclical position of the economy.
6  
Accordingly, another rationale for the implementation of numerical fiscal rules is to 
prevent policymakers from exacerbating macroeconomic volatility through pro-
cyclical fiscal policies. In particular, a widespread consensus on the beneficial role of 
rules to restrict government expenditure has emerged, as summarised by the European 
Commission’s assessment that: Enforced national expenditure rules (…) help to 
counteract forces leading to pro-cyclical fiscal policy in good times and thus prevent 
the need to retrench in bad times.
7 On these grounds, several policy observers have 
advised governments to strengthen domestic expenditure rules as a means to improve 
fiscal discipline over the business cycle.
8 
Yet, while the favourable view of domestic expenditure rules has been supported by 
country experiences,
9 econometric evidence regarding their impact on the cyclical 
stance of fiscal policy has been relatively scarce. For a panel of fifteen EU countries 
over the period 1998-2005, Wierts (2008) finds that government spending displayed a 
less pro-cyclical response to revenue shocks in the presence of strict numerical 
expenditure rules. Similarly, for a sample of eleven EU countries over the period 
1980-2005, Turrini (2008) finds that pro-cyclical expenditure dynamics in good times 
tend to be less pronounced in countries with strong expenditure rules.  
Our contribution to this literature is twofold: first, we take a particular perspective as 
regards the definition of fiscal cyclicality, in that we do not study expenditure 
outcomes directly but relative to previous plans. To be specific, we seek to answer the 
question: given a certain expenditure target, how do governments adjust their fiscal 
stance to surprising developments in the cyclical position of the economy? 
Accordingly, expenditure overruns (shortfalls) in years of better (worse) than 
expected cyclical conditions are considered pro-cyclical; counter-cyclical and a-
                                                 
6 See Galí and Perotti (2003), Lane (2003), Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004), Fatás and Mihov 
(2003, 2006), Akitoby et al. (2006), Lamo et al. (2007), and Turrini (2008).  
7 European Commission, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Quarterly Report on 
the Euro Area Vol. 3 Nr. 3, 2004, p. 37.  
8 See for example, IMF (2009). 
9 See for example, Ljungman (2008). 
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cyclical policies are defined analogously.
10 As pointed out by Poterba (1994), this 
approach allows us to directly identify how government spending adjusts to news on 
the state of the economy. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that the adherence to 
spending plans is particularly relevant for overall budgetary performance in the EU;
11 
budgetary lapses, such as breaches of the 3% of GDP reference value for the 
government deficit established by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth 
Pact, tended to be mainly driven by expenditure overruns.
12  
Second, we separately analyse the incentive effect of numerical expenditure rules with 
respect to discretionary and non-discretionary items of government expenditure. This 
distinction seems important since aggregate government expenditure typically 
includes items (such as interest expenditure or certain legally mandated transfers), that 
can barely be adjusted by policymakers in the short-run, even if they had an incentive 
to do so. At the same time, predictions concerning the impact of fiscal rules on fiscal 
cyclicality presuppose that government spending can react spontaneously to 
exogenous shocks. Hence, studying overall expenditure may partly conceal policy 
responses since spending items with low budgetary flexibility hamper the statistical 
inference of systematic behavioural reactions related to discretionary expenditure. 
The paper is organised as follows: the next section describes and discusses the 
construction of variables and presents the econometric model. Section 3 reports 
regression results. Section 4 discusses policy implications and concludes. 
2 Empirical Strategy 
2.1 Measuring deviations between expenditure outcomes and plans 
Our aim is to capture the discrepancy between governments’ actual expenditure policy 
for a given period and their previously formulated expenditure plans. We obtain the 
latter from the EU Member States’ Stability and Convergence Programmes which we 
interpret as reflecting the governments’ fiscal policy stance ex ante,  i.e. before 
                                                 
10 The definition of expenditure overruns and shortfalls is similar to that in Wierts (2008). However, we 
focus on the policy response to changes in cyclical conditions rather than revenue due to the 
simultaneity of revenue and expenditure decisions. 
11 See Turrini (2008) and Beetsma et al. (2009). 
12 These findings are based on the analysis of the medium-term budgetary objectives reported in the EU 
Member States’ Stability and Convergence Programmes by Moulin and Wierts (2006). For a more 
recent study of expenditure overruns in euro area countries see also the European Central Bank 2008.  
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changes in macroeconomic situations take place. Accordingly, we may write the 
explanatory variable for deviations in total spending as 
,, ,
total total total
it it it dev g g =− % , 
where  ,
total
it g  denotes the actual ratio of total expenditure relative to nominal GDP in 




it g %  denotes the forecast for the expenditure ratio 
as published in the respective Stability or Convergence Programme from period  1 − t . 
Since the explanatory variables are expressed in percent of revised nominal GDP (see 
below), before computing deviations we multiply  ,
total
it g %  by the European 
Commission’s GDP forecast from the corresponding forecast vintage and divide by 
revised nominal GDP.
14 Deviations in primary expenditure are defined accordingly. 
In light of related literature, the use of Stability and Convergence Programmes as 
measures of government intentions merits discussion. As pointed out by several 
commentators, governments might use these programmes as a strategic device, e.g. to 
signal to the European authorities that they intend to meet their obligations under the 
Stability and Growth Pact.
15 Hence, the reported fiscal paths for future periods might 
deviate from those which governments consider feasible based on internal projections. 
Yet, these considerations do not affect our analysis in a fundamental way: the 
projections we use to compute the dependent variables refer to a 1-year horizon; these 
figures are in most cases equivalent to the budgets approved by national Parliaments. 
Thus, in contrast to projections over a longer time horizon, they embed a direct 
political commitment. This in turn strongly limits the scope for manipulation of these 
forecasts, e.g. for use in a signalling game with the European authorities.
16 
                                                 
13 Hereafter, we will refer to data obtained from this source as “revised” figures.  
14 This procedure leads to a slight inconsistency since the Commission’s GDP forecast may deviate 
from that implied in the expenditure ratio forecast by Member States. However, in several Stability and 
Convergence Programmes, the latter is not available in levels but only in growth rates. Thus, in the 
ensuing econometric analysis we control for differences between the Commission’s and Member 
States’ growth rate forecasts (see Section 3). 
15 See Strauch et al. (2004), Moulin and Wierts (2006), Stéclebout-Orseau and Hallerberg (2007), von 
Hagen (2008), and Beetsma et al. (2009). 
16 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us. 
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Table 1 displays summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
While all EU Member States are required to submit Stability or Convergence 
Programmes on a yearly basis, lack of data availability regarding some explanatory 
variables reduces the sample to 145 observations over the period 2002-2008 (see 
section 2.3). As apparent from the first line of table 1, total general government 
expenditure at the sample average exceeds its planned levels by more than 1% of 
GDP. However, this figure is subject to substantial heterogeneity, with some 
deviations between spending outcomes and plans well above 5% of GDP in absolute 
value. Similar patterns may be observed for primary expenditure. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent variables    
Deviation Total Expenditure 145 1.07 1.75 -7.03 6.39
Deviation Primary Expenditure 145 1.12 1.73 -6.80 6.28
Deviation Discretionary Expenditure 139 0.09 0.68 -2.22 -2.75
Deviation Interest Expenditure 145 -0.54 0.28 -0.69 1.32
Explanatory variables
Output Gap Surprise 145 0.71 1.25 -2.88 5.43
Expenditure Rules Index 145 0 1 -0.79 2.27
Debt Ratio 145 50.33 26.62 3.49 106.89
Expenditure Ratio 145 45.04 5.90 33.34 56.95
Revenue Ratio 145 43.89 6.29 32.04 57.69
Budget balance ratio 145 -1.14 2.73 -9.32 5.33
GDP deflator 145 3.63 3.28 -0.72 20.30
Note: all variables except for GDP deflator and expenditure rules index are expressed in % of GDP. 
GDP deflator is measured in terms of percentage change on preceding year.  
 
2.2 Differentiating between discretionary and non-discretionary spending 
In a second step, we use disaggregated information on government expenditure to 
compute deviations between plans and outcomes for discretionary and non-
discretionary spending items. For that purpose, we differentiate between expenditure 
items which are readily manipulated by policy-makers (i.e. discretionary) and those 
which are, in the short-run, exogenous from the government’s perspective (i.e. non-
discretionary). Of course, this differentiation is not straightforward and in most cases 
requires specific judgement.
17 
                                                 
17 Since 2001, EU Member States have been required to provide detailed projections in their Stability 
and Convergence Programmes for: collective consumption, social transfers in kind, social transfers 
other than in kind, interest payments, subsidies, gross fixed capital formation, and other expenditure.  
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To avoid definitional complexities, we focus on those spending items whose 
categorisation appears fairly unambiguous. In the context of discretionary 
expenditure, these comprise spending on subsidies and spending on gross fixed 











t i g g g g dev , , , , ,
~ ~ − − + =  , 
where  ,
subs
it g  is the actual ratio of spending on subsidies relative to nominal GDP in 
country  i at time t  as reported in the autumn 2008 vintage of the European 
Commission’s Ameco Database;  ,
gcap
it g  captures the corresponding values for gross 
fixed capital formation;  ,
subs
it g %  and  ,
gcap
it g %  denote the forecast for the respective 
expenditure component as published in the Stability or Convergence Programme from 
period  1 − t .
18  
Of course, these two expenditure items do not comprise all aspects of government 
spending which should be considered discretionary. However, while it would be 
desirable to exploit information on all available expenditure components, the data 
structure in the SCP inhibits a more inclusive definition. In particular, the categories 
collective consumption and other expenditure lump together both discretionary and 
non-discretionary spending items which may not be disentangled based on the 
available information; social expenditure (both “in kind” and “other than in kind”) 
displays large degrees of cross-country heterogeneity in terms of the types of 
government spending implied, so that a classification as either discretionary or non-
discretionary would have to rely on arbitrary assumptions. Accordingly, interest 
expenditure (
intexp
, it g ) is the only spending item which may be considered as non-
discretionary government spending in a straightforward manner. Hence, we define the 




it it it dev g g =− % . 
                                                 
18 Since Spain only reports gross fixed capital formation in their 2001-2005 Stability Programme 
vintages we only compute the forecast error for gross fixed capital formation in this case to obtain 
,
disc
it dev . 
11
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1169
April 2010 
Given the above qualifications, the ensuing empirical analysis does not aim to fully 
explain the short-term dynamics of discretionary and non-discretionary government 
expenditure in the sample. Much rather we use the selected spending items as polar 
cases to illustrate the structural differences in the reactions of discretionary and non-
discretionary spending to the business cycle. As in the case of overall and primary 
expenditure, both deviations in discretionary and in non-discretionary spending are 
expressed in percent of revised nominal GDP. 
The upper part of table 1 contains summary statistics for the deviations between 
outcomes and plans in the disaggregated spending variables.
19 While, in line with 
overall government expenditure, actual discretionary spending on average exceeds 
planned levels, interest expenditure tends to fall short of plans.  
2.3 Measuring output gap surprises 
In line with related literature, we use the gap between actual and trend GDP as a 
measure for the cyclical position of the economy.
20 Since we are interested in 
“surprising” developments in the cyclical position, also here we include this variable 
in terms of the deviation between projected and actual levels. To be specific, we seek 
to capture the discrepancies between the actual cyclical position of the economy in 
period t and the cyclical position that governments expected for period t at the time 
when they produced their fiscal forecast, in period t – 1.  
Hence, a potential proxy for the governments’ expectations on cyclical developments 
has to meet two requirements: first, it should be relevant, i.e. it should derive from an 
authoritative source which governments are likely to perceive as a benchmark for 
their own projections. Second, it should be up-to-date, i.e. the time span between the 
release of the output gap forecast and the preparation of the SCP should be 
sufficiently short. Led by these guidelines we choose the output gap projections from 
the European Commission’s autumn forecast as a proxy for the government 
expectations; given that these forecasts are typically released in the third quarter of the 
year, they provide a timely measure for the outlook on future economic conditions 
which prevails at the time when the SCP projections are finalised.  
                                                 
19 Belgium, Malta, and France do not report sufficiently disaggregated spending plans in the 2001 
vintage, the 2005 vintage, and 2001-2004 Programme vintages, respectively, to compute discretionary 
spending deviations thus reducing the sample size for this variables by six observations. 
20 See, for example, Balassone and Francese (2004) and Cimadomo (2008). 
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Accordingly, the explanatory variable for “output gap surprises” ( it OG ) is defined as 
the difference between the revised actual output gap in period t and the European 
Commission’s output gap forecast (from period t-1) for period t. To avoid differences 
between the denominator of the dependent variable and the output gap surprise 
variable from affecting our estimation results, we make an additional adjustment: the 
output gap outcome is multiplied with the outcome for trend GDP; output gap 
forecasts are multiplied with the European Commission’s trend GDP forecast from the 
corresponding forecast vintage; and finally the difference between these two variables 
is expressed in percent of revised nominal GDP. Output gap projections for new 
Member States are available from 2005 onwards, and for all other countries from 
2002 onwards, thus amounting to 145 observations for the full sample.
21  
2.4 Measuring domestic expenditure rules 
To capture the extent to which national expenditure policy faces domestic institutional 
constraints, we use the expenditure rules index as developed by Debrun et al. 
(2008).
22 This index is based on a survey conducted by the Working Group on the 
Quality of Public Finances among practitioners and researchers in the field of fiscal 
policy. It includes all budgetary provisions which fix numerical targets or ceilings to 
government expenditure. To attach weights to different institutions, the index takes 
into account both the share of overall public spending covered by the rule and 
qualitative features such as the type of enforcement mechanisms and media visibility. 
As pointed out by Inman (1996), the actual enforcement of rules is particularly 
important to capture the extent to which expenditure policy is really restricted by the 
institutional framework. Taken together, this measure bears strong appeal for 
empirical implementation as it translates a broad set of institutional provisions into a 
country-specific cardinal ranking.
23 Moreover, the use of this index in related 
literature facilitates comparability of results across different studies.
24 
                                                 
21 Since expenditure plans for Bulgaria and Romania are only available starting in 2007 they are not 
considered in the below econometric analysis.   
22 For a definition and a detailed description of the computation of this index see European 
Commission (2006) and Debrun et al. (2008). The index is normalised to have a zero mean and unit 
variance.  
23 The index also displays some time-variability, especially in the 1990’s. However, for the time-period 
considered in this study the index only varies across countries but not across time, except for a single 
increase in the expenditure rule index in Italy in 2004 and in France in 2005.  
24 See e.g., European Commission (2006), Wierts (2008), and Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009). 
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Theoretical considerations point to two different channels through which expenditure 
rules might mitigate pro-cyclical spending bias: first, if rules are binding in that both a 
marginal increase in public spending leads to non-compliance and non-compliance is 
associated with political or legal sanctions, they provide a direct incentive for fiscal 
discipline. Second, as pointed out by Schuknecht (2004) as well as Morris et al. 
(2006), numerical fiscal rules may induce budgetary discipline indirectly, in that they 
serve as benchmarks against which imperfectly informed electorates evaluate 
governments’ fiscal performance.
25 Hence, in the presence of strong numerical rules 
expenditure policy should be more consistent with budgetary targets and less prone to 
pro-cyclical reactions even if they do not bind in a strict sense.  
The workings of expenditure rules differ with respect to the sign of the underlying 
shock: in case of positive surprises, expenditure rules directly restrain the 
government’s tendency to use additional revenues for budgetary expansion. In the 
case of negative surprises, the effect is indirect in that their favourable impact on 
budgetary discipline in good times prevents the need for fiscal tightening in bad times. 
2.5 Econometric Model 
To analyse the impact of expenditure rules on budgetary discipline over the cycle, we 
estimate the following equation: 
,, , , , ()
kk
it i t it it i it it dev c d OG OG ER X u αβ γ =++ + × + +  
where 
k
t i dev ,  refers to deviations between actual and planned levels of spending with 
respect to spending category k  (i.e. total, primary, discretionary, or interest)  for 
country i in period t;  t i OG ,  is the output gap surprise for country i in period t;  i ER  is a 
country-specific vector which indicates the “strength” of national expenditure rules; 
i t i ER OG × ,  is an interaction term between output gap surprises and the expenditure 
rules index.  t d  and  i c  are full sets of time and country fixed effects, respectively; t i X ,  
is a matrix containing n time and country-specific control variables and 
k
t i u ,   are 
random error terms for the respective specification.  
                                                 
25 See Alesina and Perotti (1996), for a discussion of reasons and means for politicians to reduce 
transparency on public finances. 
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Since government expenditure is an important component of aggregate demand 
simultaneity problems might arise with respect to variables measuring cyclical 
conditions. To address the resulting identification problem we exploit the “structural” 
part of output gap surprises for causal inference: forecast errors may arise from 
unexpected developments in actual and/or in trend GDP. Since the latter – by 
definition – is essentially unaffected by short-run fluctuations in the time series for 
GDP, we also treat it as exogenous to those fluctuations caused by changes in 
government spending.
26 Thus, we instrument the output gap surprise variable with the 
forecast error in trend GDP. We extend the instrument set by average output gaps in 
all foreign sample countries to capture international cyclical developments, not 
affected by domestic expenditure policy. While the exogeneity assumption for this 
variable, à priori, appears less compelling than for the forecast error in trend GDP, the 
number of instruments allows us to test the validity of the instrument set. 
Another potential source of endogeneity problems originates from the expenditure 
rules index. Related literature argues that numerical fiscal rules may not be treated as 
an exogenous variable since unobservable country-specific preferences might be 
positively associated with both fiscal accuracy and the propensity to implement these 
restrictions.
27 Moreover, the self-commitment implied in binding numerical fiscal 
rules provides an incentive for governments with higher ability or willingness for 
achieving fiscal targets to implement stricter fiscal rules.
28 However, given that the 
expenditure rules index displays almost no variation over the sample period, 
unobservable country-specific preferences for fiscal discipline are captured by the 
fixed effects. Furthermore, simultaneity bias is unlikely to impair our results due to 
the short time dimension of our sample: the type of institutional restrictions 
considered in the expenditure rules index are defined as permanent constraints on 
fiscal policy.
29 In most cases, these constraints are integrated into a multi-annual 
budgetary framework and/or based on legal, constitutional, or long term political 
commitments which are not readily adjusted to accommodate current fiscal 
                                                 
26 The European Commission computes trend GDP based on a Hodrick-Prescott filter; according to this 
method, trend values tend to be strongly influenced by actual values at the end of the sample. However, 
the Commission’s methodology corrects for the end point bias, thus supporting our identification 
strategy; see European Commission (2008).  
27 See Inman (1996) and Poterba (1996). 
28 See Debrun and Kumar (2007). 
29 See Kopits and Symanski (1998) and Debrun et al. (2008). 
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developments. As pointed out by Alesina and Perotti (1996, 1999), they may thus be 
considered exogenous. 
The set of control variables includes the lagged stock of government debt and in some 
specifications the lagged fiscal balance to reflect the possibility that the overall fiscal 
position may influence the extent to which external fiscal surveillance and the 
financial markets force governments to comply with their expenditure targets.
30 To 
allow for systematic differences in budgetary decision-making across countries with 
large and small public sectors lagged values of the expenditure or revenue ratio are 
included.
31 In several specifications, we augment the model with a dummy which 
equals one in years of parliamentary elections and zero otherwise to take into account 
that upcoming elections may reinforce the incentive to “buy political support” in the 
short run.
32 Finally, in several specifications we explicitly control for inflation rates as 
they may affect government expenditure and nominal GDP differently thus giving rise 
to a “mechanical correlation” between output gap surprises and the denominator of 
the dependent variables. Descriptive statistics on these control variables are shown in 
the bottom part of table 1. 
3 Results 
Table 2 reports baseline regression results. The positive coefficient on the output gap 
surprise in column 1 points to pro-cyclical slippages in overall expenditure.
33 To be 
specific, an output gap surprise of one percentage point on average goes along with a 
deviation between spending outcomes and plans of almost half a percentage point in 
the same direction. At the same time, the negative coefficient for the interaction term 
indicates that this pro-cyclical pattern is less pronounced in countries with strong 
expenditure rules. In particular, an increase in the expenditure index by one standard 
                                                 
30 For a similar interpretation see Galí and Perotti (2003). 
31 For example, Beetsma et al. (2009) find that countries with higher expenditure ratios tended to adopt 
more ambitious expenditure plans. 
32 Several empirical studies suggest that the degree of political fragmentation may influence budgetary 
discipline (see e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1999), Kontopoulos and Perotti (2002), and Fabrizio and Mody 
(2006)). However, none of the common indicators of political fragmentation was statistically 
significant in our specification. 
33 As regards interpretation, a word of caution is in order: a positive (negative) coefficient for the 
variable measuring output gap surprises does not necessarily imply a de-stabilising (stabilising) fiscal 
stance. Much rather, this interpretation only holds if the initial output gap is positive. Starting, by 
contrast, from a negative output gap a positive coefficient implies that a government contributes more 
to stabilising the economy. However, based on the definition adopted in this analysis (see section 2) in 
both cases a positive coefficient is considered to indicate pro-cyclical policy reactions. 
16
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1169
April 2010 
deviation almost reduces the pro-cyclical deviation in government expenditure by two 
thirds. 
Qualitatively similar results obtain when analysing primary and discretionary 
expenditure (see columns 2 and 3). However, the precision of estimates differs 
notably across specifications. While in the case of total expenditure, coefficients for 
the output gap surprise and the interaction term are statistically significant at a 10% 
significance level only, for primary expenditure the null hypotheses is rejected at a 
5% level and significance rises further when studying discretionary expenditure. 
These patterns are in line with the considerations presented in section 2.2: the fewer 
spending items with a low degree of budgetary flexibility are considered in the 
dependent variable, the more salient is the pro-cyclical response of government 
expenditure. A natural robustness check for this hypothesis is to repeat these exercises 
using non-discretionary spending components, exclusively. As expected, output gap 
surprises do not exert a significant influence on deviations in interest expenditure 
from targets (see column 4). These results illustrate the importance to differentiate 
between expenditure items based on their budgetary flexibility in tests of the spending 
bias hypothesis. 
Table 2: Baseline Regression Results 













Output Gap Surprise (OGS) 0.44* 0.47** 0.34*** -0.03
(0.24) (0.24) (0.08) (0.04)
(OGS)*(Expenditure Rules Index) -0.28* -0.31** -0.11** 0.02
(0.16) (0.16) (0.04) (0.02)
Government Debt (first lag) 0.07** 0.09*** 0.02* -0.01***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00)
Total Government Spending (first lag) -0.05 -0.03 0.01 -0.01
(0.11) (0.11) (0.04) (0.02)
Observations 145 145 139 145
Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions (p-value)
0.43 0.69 0.94 0.08
Difference in Sargan/Hansen test for 
suspect instruments (p-value) 
0.29 0.56 0.78 0.03
Difference in Sargan/Hansen test for 
endogenous regressor (p-value) 
0.13 0.10 0.45 0.56
Kleinbergen-Paap rk Wald F-Statistic
(Critical value Stock-Yogo weak 
identification test for 5% maximal IV 
relative bias: 11.4
and 10% maximal distortion of Wald test: 
16.9)
32.93 32.93 34.56 32.93
Note: All estimates are obtained from two-stage least squares estimation including country- and time-fixed effects. Excluded 
instruments for the output gap surprise and its interaction with the expenditure rules index are the forecast error in trend GDP, 
the average output gap in all other ountries in the sample and the corresponding interaction terms. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.  
17
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1169
April 2010 
Interestingly, the lagged level of debt has a significant positive impact on slippages in 
total, primary and discretionary spending. An immediate interpretation to this finding 
is that accumulation of debt and the propensity to miss budgetary targets are driven by 
common unobservable factors. However, since the identification of causal effects of 
debt levels on expenditure policy is not at the centre of our attention we do not further 
investigate this issue. 
The lagged expenditure level does not affect the tendency for deviations between 
outcomes and plans. As robustness checks, we replace this variable with the lagged 
revenue ratio and the lagged budget balance ratio (see table A1 in the Appendix).
34 
Moreover, we include the lagged spending item under consideration (i.e. lagged 
primary and discretionary spending), to allow for the possibility that the ambition of 
fiscal plans depends on the initial size of the respective budgetary aggregate (see 
columns one and two of table A2).
35 Finally, we explicitly control for factors giving 
rise to a “denominator effect” described above (columns three to five of table A2). To 
this end, we add inflation and the difference between the nominal GDP growth 
forecast from period t-1 by the European Commission and the one reported in the 
Stability and Convergence Programmes as additional regressors.
36 Our main results 
are essentially unaffected by these variations in the basic model. 
Given the non-responsive nature of interest spending, we focus on primary and 
discretionary spending in the remainder. In the specification shown in columns 1 and 
2 of table 3, we augment the basic model by the dummy variable for parliamentary 
elections. Consistent with related literature,
37 the notion of politically motivated fiscal 
profligacy finds some support in our analysis: countries on average record significant 
positive primary expenditure overruns in election years. However, no such effect is 
detected for discretionary spending deviations.  
Throughout this analysis, the relevant specification tests support our identification 
strategy. Based on the Sargan/Hansen statistic, the instrumental variables pass the 
                                                 
34 Since deviations in interest expenditure do not respond to output gap surprises they are not reported 
in the remainder of the analysis. 
35 For example, Beetsma, Giuliodori, and Wierts (2009) find that the plans reported in Stability and 
Convergence Programmes depend on the starting point of the respected budgetary item. 
36 For the rationale for the inclusion of these variables see the end of the preceding section and footnote 
28, respectively. 
37 See e.g., Buti and van den Noord (2004) and Cimadomo (2008). 
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overidentification test. Also, despite our initial doubts concerning the validity of the 
average output gap in foreign countries as an instrumental variable, the difference-in-
Sargan tests do not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. The null hypothesis of 
weak instruments is clearly rejected. Finally, in many specifications we can not reject 
the null hypothesis that output gap surprises are endogenous or the p-values of the 
corresponding test statistic are only slightly above 10% thus suggesting the use of 
instrumental variable estimation. 
 
Table 3: Impact of parliamentary elections and asymmetries in good and bad times 













Output Gap Surprise (OGS) 0.46** 0.35***
(0.24) (0.08)
(OGS)*(Expenditure Rules Index) -0.28* -0.10**
(0.17) (0.04)
Government Debt (first lag) 0.10*** 0.02* 0.08*** 0.02*
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Primary Government Spending (first lag) -0.06 0.01 -0.09 0.01
(0.11) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04)
Parliamentary Election 0.48* 0.07
(0.26) (0.08)
OGS if Output Gap > 0 0.59** 0.37***
(0.28) (0.11)
OGS if Output Gap < 0 0.08 0.17
(0.70) (0.24)
(OGS)*(Expenditure Rules Index) if Output Gap > 0 -0.17 -0.14**
(0.26) (0.06)
(OGS)*(Expenditure Rules Index) if Output Gap < 0 -0.58 -0.01
(0.45) (0.18)
Observations 145 139 145 139
Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value) 0.71 0.97 0.59 0.91
Difference in Sargan/Hansen test for suspect instruments (p-
value) 
0.73 0.85 0.50 0.77
Difference in Sargan/Hansen test for endogenous regressor 
(p-value) 
0.11 0.43 0.16 0.80
Kleinbergen-Paap rk Wald F-Statistic
(Critical value Stock-Yogo weak identification test for 5% 
maximal IV relative bias: 11.0
and 10% maximal distortion of Wald test: 16.9)
33.8 34.6 n.a. n.a.
Note: All estimates are obtained from two-stage least squares estimation including country- and time-fixed effects. Excluded instruments for the 
output gap surprise and its interaction with the expenditure rules index are the forecast error in trend GDP, the average output gap in all other 
ountries in the sample and the corresponding interaction terms. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant 
at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.   
Economic intuition suggests that spending bias may have asymmetric effects on 
government expenditure depending on the cyclical position: while pressures for extra 
spending in good times directly derive from the political economy of the budget 
process, pro-cyclical tightening in bad times results from the need to make up for this 
spending profligacy and to ensure fiscal sustainability. However, given that none of 
the countries studied here faced acute sustainability concerns over the sample period, 
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this secondary effect might be limited. Much rather, spending bias may give rise to 
“cyclical ratcheting” in that pro-cyclical fiscal expansions are not compensated for in 
downturns.
38 As discussed in section 2.5, a similar asymmetry applies to the impact of 
expenditure rules due to their direct (indirect) effect on spending policies in upturns 
(downturns).  
To test this intuition, we modify the baseline specification by allowing the coefficients 
of  t i OG ,  and  i t i ER OG × ,  to differ depending on whether output gap surprises take 
place at positive or negative values of the output gap (see columns 3 and 4 in table 
3).
39 The results support the notion of asymmetric reactions in good and bad times: for 
both primary and discretionary spending the former coefficient is statistically 
significant and somewhat higher than in the specifications that do not account for 
asymmetries. As regards the impact of expenditure rules, the results give a mixed 
picture. In the case of discretionary spending, the hypothesis that expenditure rules 
curb the risk of pro-cyclical spending overruns is corroborated. By contrast, no 
statistically significant effect is found for the corresponding coefficient in the 
specification for primary spending. However, these results should be interpreted with 
some caution: the distinction between good and bad times forces us to instrument two 
additional variables which in turn may aggravate problems of small sample bias. 
4 Conclusion 
Building on the theory of spending bias, this paper analysed how numerical 
expenditure rules shape the response of government spending to unexpected changes 
in macroeconomic conditions. We find that government spending reacts pro-cyclically 
to surprises in the output gap and that strong domestic expenditure rules serve to 
mitigate this tendency. Thus, from a policy perspective the results confirm both the 
need for institutional restrictions to expenditure policy and their effectiveness. 
Furthermore, our analysis suggests that the above empirical findings depend on the 
type of government expenditure considered in the analysis: while the pro-cyclical bias 
is particularly pronounced for spending items with a high degree of budgetary flexi-
                                                 
38 See Jerkewitz and Strawczynski (2004). 
39 An alternative way to conceptualise asymmetries would be to analyse positive and negative output 
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bility, no cyclical patterns may be detected for (largely non-discretionary) interest 
expenditure. A potential qualification to this conclusion derives from the difficulty to 
separate spending items based on the degree of budgetary flexibility: our focus on 
deviations between actual policy and budgetary targets, as formulated in EU Member 
States’ Stability and Convergence Programmes, forced us to isolate only selected 
spending items which can be assigned to the categories of “discretionary” and “non-
discretionary” expenditure in a straightforward manner. A study of different aspects 
of expenditure policy based on a more comprehensive definition of discretionary and 
non-discretionary spending would lend further credence to our conclusions. However, 
the benefit of explaining a larger set of spending items would come at a cost: 
deviations between outcomes and targets in itself provide an informative measure of 
fiscal discipline; yet, the above extension would (to the best of our knowledge) only 
be feasible on the basis of an isolated analysis of budgetary outcomes and not be 
compatible with a comparison of outcomes and plans. 
For the institutional design of numerical expenditure rules the results from the 
disaggregated analysis of government spending imply a trade-off: on the one hand, 
extending the scope of the rules to non-discretionary spending items may be 
unnecessary and compliance would be more dependent on factors outside the control 
of policy-makers. On the other hand, transparency is likely to suffer from an 
exemption of certain aspects of government activity. This in turn would reinforce the 
policy-makers’ information advantage over their electorate and creditors and thus 
undermine the primary purpose of numerical fiscal rules. Moreover, in the long term 
essentially all government spending can be influenced by policy-makers. Thus, 
diverting fiscal accountability away from certain spending items may introduce or 
reinforce a bias of fiscal policy towards the status quo. Vice versa, tying current 
governments’ political track record to their success in achieving lasting fiscal 
adjustment (e.g. by lowering debt today and thus reducing future interest spending) 
may actually mitigate inter-temporal co-ordination failures in fiscal policy: 
governments will have a stronger incentive to implement reforms which yield benefits 
in periods beyond the current politicians’ time horizon. 
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